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2. General Review 
The International economy 
At present it is difficult to form a generally agreed view on what has 
happened during the last six months to the world economy. It is 
impossible to establish an agreed view of what will happen in the next 
six months. The debate and the uncertainty centre round the current 
recession in world trade. There is no argument that the current 
recession is the most severe to be experienced since the last war. 
The problem lies in forecasting how and when recovery will take place. 
The rather murky picture of events in the first half of 1975 hardly gives 
ground for optimism and certainly contradicts those forecasters who 
expected a quick recovery. It is apparent that not only is the 
amplitude of the downturn greater than any which has been experienced 
post-war, but also the length of time needed to effect a recovery is 
unprecedented over the same period. 
In the aftermath of the oil price rises in late 1973, industrial 
production in the OECD countries has fallen and unemployment has risen 
sharply. The fall in industrial production took effect from about the 
middle of 1974, and was mostly a reaction to the deflationary monetary 
and fiscal policies which were adopted to alleviate the strain on the 
balance of payments position, and to minimise the domestic inflation 
likely to be causes by the general rise in the prices of primary 
commodities, including oil. In the first two quarters of 1975 the down-
ward trend in industrial production appears to have continued. One 
exception is Japan which experienced a slight rise in the second quarter. 
Certain industries have been particularly badly hit. For instance total 
OECD production of textiles was 8% lower at the beginning of 1975 than it 
was during 1970. Chemical production in the OECD declined by over 12% 
between the first quarter of 1974 and the first quarter of 1975. Basic 
metal production fell by 16% over the same period, while the output of 
metal products fell by 10%. The contraction of world markets for these 
and other commodities has, as we shall see in later sections, had damaging 
effects on the Scottish economy. 
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By July of this year most of the OECD countries, with the exception of 
the UK, had begun to reduce their rates of domestic inflation. Further, 
thanks mainly to large increases in imports by the oil-consuming 
countries, the collective balance of payments current account for the 
larger OECD countries is estimated to have moved into substantial surplus 
in the second quarter of this year. 
Given these two factors of improving balance of payments, and falling 
rates of inflation, the stage seemed set for the implementation of 
domestic reflationary policies to return these economies to a path of 
steady expansion, from which they had been so abruptly diverted by the 
OPEC cartel. However, many governments have been cautious about 
adopting expansionary policies despite pressure by the IMF on those 
countries least troubled by balance of payments difficulties to take the 
lead in reflation. 
The Japanese government has already administered three mild doses of 
reflation to its economy. The last package, announced in September, is 
an injection of around $6.7bill ion which is intended to push the growth 
rate up to around St. 
However, it is around the US economy that most interest is centred at 
present. A necessary condition for the expansion of world trade, and 
therefore the recovery of those economies, including the UK, who rely 
heavily on external trade, is a recovery in the United States. The 
confusion mentioned at the beginning of this section stems largely from 
uncertainty as to what interpretation should be put on recently published 
statistics of US economic activity. 
In July this year there were at least four factors signalling an upturn 
in the US economy during the second half of 1975: 
- the rise in the rate of inflation had apparently been reversed. 
From a 14% rate in the three months ended October 1974 the rate of 
increase in consumer prices fell to 5% in the three months ending 
May 1975 
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- the composite index of leading indicators had been rising since 
March 
- the money supply had been expanding considerably more rapidly 
from January 
- there were certain indications of an actual recovery such as a 
large increase in housing starts in May and a steady rise in 
retail sales from April. 
However, the opinion that the US was moving steadily toward recovery was 
given a severe setback recently when figures were released indicating 
that the rate of inflation had risen sharply in the period June to 
August, moving into double figures once more. Further, and perhaps as 
a reaction to this rise, retail sales dropped by 0.8% in August. A 
definite rise in inflation would be likely to make the American 
authorities much more cautious about adopting expansionary policies. 
This would inevitably delay world recovery. The crucial question which 
has not yet received a definitive answer is whether the rise is a 
temporary aberration due to special factors, such as American grain sales 
to Russia pushing up world food prices, or whether the rise is due to 
the expansionary measures which President Ford has already initiated. 
Whatever the correct answer it is to be expected that the American 
authorities will be unwilling to adopt further expansionary measures 
until there is a clear reduction in the rate of inflation. This will 
inevitably delay world recovery for longer than had previously been 
expected. Thus, contrary to the view expressed in the last Commentary 
it seems unlikely that output in the OECD countries will increase before 
the end of the year. This inevitably means further increases in 
unemployment through the first half of 1976, given the lag in employment 
demand to changes in output. 
The United Kingdom 
In the last issue of the Commentary (July 1975 page 12), we pointed out 
that, while the UK had so far postponed the necessary internal adjustment 
of the economy, it could not expect to escape it. This prediction has 
now been confirmed by the fall in GDP in the second quarter of 1975. 
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Both The Bank of England and The National Institute of Economic and 
Social Research foresee GDP reaching its nadir during the third or fourth 
quarter of this year, followed by a very slow recovery, in effect, 
stagnation through 1976. The National Institute estimates the year-on-
year change in GDP to be a decrease of |% from 1974 to 1975, and then an 
increase of 1.2% from 1975 to 1976. While output is slowly increasing 
next year, unemployment is seen to continue rising. The National 
Institute estimate for unemployment this winter (seasonally adjusted, 
excluding school leavers and adult students) is li million, rising perhaps 
to 1J million by the end of 1976. 
Against the broad indicators relating to the second quarter of 1975, three 
particular statistics stand out. First, it is clear that the fall in 
output has occurred most sharply in the manufacturing sectors of the 
economy. There, the index of output fell more sharply from first to 
second quarters than it did even between the last quarter of 1973 and the 
first quarter of 1974, when the three-day week was in operation. Secondly, 
there was a notable check to the growth rate of employment income in the 
second quarter, and thirdly all components of final demand fell in the 
second quarter in real terms except public expenditure. 
The check to the growth of income from employment foreshadowed the fall 
in real personal disposable income which has already set in, and which is 
expected to continue throughout the next six quarters, (i.e. until the 
end of 1976). For many commentators the critical question in the 
management of economic policy over the next six quarters is whether the 
political pressure to reflate, brought about by rising unemployment and 
falling living standards, can be resisted. To this is closely related 
political pressure for import controls. 
Official strategy can be described as monetary wage restraint coupled 
with a policy of abating domestic inflationary pressures and waiting for 
the hoped-for upturn in world trade. This period of waiting, which 
might well extend to one and a half years, might usefully be occupied 
by attention to the underlying structural problems of the British 
economy. The proper solution to the problem of large foreign motor 
